Abstract-Future railway systems should bring convenience to people's lives. In fact, due to the move away from bespoke standalone systems to open-platform, standardized equipments and increasing use of networked control and automation systems and connected technologies, the efficiency and the safety of railway services are improving. However, this dependence of automation, control and communication technologies makes railway systems becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks and security threats which affects the overall performance. This paper deals with cybersecurity concerns facing these systems. As such, we analyse characteristics of railway threat landscape. Then, we discuss the direct impacts of the identified potential threats and their consequences on the whole system and we evaluate resulted risks. For space limitation, we choose to present the impact, likelihood and risk analysis for one functionality of the system, namely External Door control (EDC). Some good practices and related techniques for the development of safer, more comfortable, and more secure future railway systems are also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Train Control and Monitoring System (TCMS) is the main part of the control system of a train. It provides a control and monitoring infrastructure that enhances train operations and increases its safety and reliability. The integration of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTS) into the TCMS will improve efficiency of the railway rolling stock industry as it enables the implementation of innovative solutions, services and applications in the quest for smarter, safer and more efficient railway transportation systems. The new generation of trains will use real-time rail information and online environmental data in combination with on-board references to achieve optimal control of the train traction and braking while keeping with travel schedule and reducing energy consumption. Likewise, train passengers travelling experience will be improved through services such as connected infotainment, real-time information, etc.
Nevertheless, the process of increasing the incorporation of ICTS into railway systems presents a growing dilemma. On one hand, this innovation has become an urgent need to maintain a competitive edge comparing to other transportation systems. On the other hand, the introduction of networked devices, remote access and control capabilities, especially with the emergence of wireless communication systems as alternatives to supplant wired systems in the railway industry, all acts to increase the system exposure to cyber-threats. While cybertechnology is complex and fast evolving, cyber-attacks are also becoming increasingly automated and sophisticated. Their impact on critical infrastructures in particular railway systems, can lead to catastrophic consequences, no matter whether they are the intended target or not. Attacks on operational systems could lead to the disruption or the unavailability of the rail transport itself. When informational systems are attacked it can lead to the unavailability of services for the passenger, like being unable to buy a ticket or digitally check a ticket into the system. Consequently, cyber-attacks on the transportation sector create a large impact on society and people's daily life varying from direct effects such as delays, accidents, injuries or even deaths, to indirect effects, such as socio-economic effects.
The work presented in this paper is conducted within the European project ROLL2RAIL under the task security for TCMS that aims to identify convenient security countermeasures and to define required protection levels of TCMS assets. Yet, such outcomes can be accomplished using a coherent and strategic approach that encompasses all cybersecurity aspects. In ROLL2RAIL, the selected approach is defined by the standard ISA/IEC-62443 [1] . Due to space limitation, in this paper, we present the cyber-physical security risk assessment of one functionality of TCMS, namely the external door control. This analysis aims to identify system threats, quantify impacts and expected losses. The proposed countermeasures and mitigation techniques are not presented because they are classified.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II shortly introduces the methodology selected to establish a security risk assessment for TCMSS. Then, in section III, we identify the System under Consideration (SUC) for the security risk assessment. Next, in section IV, railway threat landscape is discussed through threat and vulnerability assessments. In section V, we present an impact, likelihood and risk analysis of potential threats against the SUC. Finally, in section VI, we review some good practices to be used in transportation system in order to minimise the identified risks.
II. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Traditional information systems security is usually based on CIA principle, standing for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability by priority order. However, for Industrial Automation Control System (IACS) such as TCMS, the priority is generally reversed depending on the specificities of the considered system. For railway systems, the most important aspect is the train movement, for that, security concern is first integrity, then availability and finally confidentiality. In fact, loss of integrity could lead to accidents or collisions, whereas loss of availability would bring the railway system to a halt. Loss of confidentiality is less of an immediate threat, but might result in the leak of sensitive operational information. As such, standards and methodologies developed for traditional information technology systems cannot be applied directly. This issue has received attention not only from researchers, but also from public authorities and standard committees during the last few years. Thereby, several information security standards have been proposed to address security issues for the particular case of IACS such as ISO/IEC 27000 [2] , ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria [3] , ISA/IEC 62443 [1] , EN 50159 [4] , RFC 2196 [5] , ETSI TS 102 165 [6] , German standards like DIN VDE V 0831-102 [7] and DIN VDE V 0831-104 [8] , US standards like FIPS PUB 199 [9] , FIPS PUB 200 [10] and NIST Special Publications (SP) like SP 800-37 [11] , SP 800-53 rev. 4 [12] , etc. An extensive study on Security standards and guidelines for IACS is available in [13] . From these security standards, ISA/IEC 62443 is considered as the most important one for ROLL2RAIL project. The ISA99 committee, which is responsible for generating the specifications, has made great efforts to bring together numerous standards and recommendations that exist and then to create a comprehensive set of documents that is consistent and broadly applicable in virtually any industrial sector. This and the fact that these specifications have now been recognized by industry worldwide through simultaneous adoption by the IEC give the ISA/IEC 62443 series a strong chance to be a single definitive set of international standards for IACS cybersecurity. This is also testified by the fact that it is recognized as pivotal security standard for Industry 4.0 project [14] and that it will be adopted by CENELEC [15] .
The standard ISA/IEC-62443 [1] provides guidance to improve electronic security and help reducing the risk of compromising confidential information or causing degradation or failure of the equipment (hardware and software) of systems under control. Thereby, ISA/IEC-62443 improves the availability, integrity and confidentiality of components or systems used for industrial automation and control, thus it enables the implementation of secure IACS.
The security risk assessment methodology proposed by ISA/IEC-62443 is composed of 13 steps, as presented in Fig. 1 . The identification of the SUC is the first step of the methodology. It consists of a functional and design specification phase that aims to identify physical and Information Technology (IT) assets of the system. Step 2 and 3 address the system threat landscape through threat and vulnerability assessments. Once potential threats and system vulnerabilities are identified, their direct impacts and cascading consequences on the whole system should be studied in step 4. Then, the likelihood of each identified threat should be determined in step 5.
Step 6 consists of the calculation of the unmitigated risk in a risk matrix using determined likelihood and impact levels. In step 7, the risk created by each identified threat should be evaluated based on the risk matrix. In step 8, countermeasures should be identified to mitigate risks evaluated unacceptable. Then, likelihoods and risks should be re-evaluated in order to measure the effectiveness of proposed solutions. In case some risks are still evaluated unacceptable, a set of additional countermeasures should be proposed and then step 9 and 10 should be repeated until all risks become acceptable. At the end, the security risk assessment should be closed by a documentation phase.
In this paper, we present the security risk assessment of EDC functionality based on the IEC 62443 methodology.
III. SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we present the system under consideration for the security risk assessment.
A. Train Control and Monitoring System (TCMS)
The TCMS of a train is mainly responsible for providing basic train control functions, such as inaugurating the train Start of the security risk assessment
Step 1: System Identification List of SuC assets Threat information sources (e.g. historical data)
Step 2: Threat Assessment List of potential threats against the SuC previous Vulnerability assessment, databases etc.
Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment
List of vulnerabilities of the SuC Threats, vulnerability assessments
Step 4: Consequence and impact determination
Assessment of impacts
Lists of threats and vulnerabilities
Step 5: Unmitigated likelihood determination
Assessment of likelihoods
Attacks potential, likelihoods, impacts and risk matrix
Step 6: Unmitigated security risk calculation Unmitigated security risk risk matrix with tolerable risk
Step 7: Risk evaluation Unmitigated security risk evaluated
Step 8: identification of countermeasures
List of countermeasures
List of applied countermeasures
Step 9: Likelihood and impact re-evaluation Updated likelihood and impact assessment Updated likelihoods, impacts and risk matrix
Step 10: Residual security risk calculation
Residual security risk
Are all residual risks bellow or at tolerable level?
Step 11: Application of additional countermeasures
Step Train Protection (ATP), On-board Driving Data Recording System (ODDRS), passenger alarm system and Closed-circuit television (CCTV) for rear view purposes.
• Operator Oriented Services (OOS) domain is where all auxiliary services for proper train operation are considered, such as : priority logic, CCTV for video surveillance purposes, infotainment in train embedded devices, mobile phone amplifiers, automatic passenger counting,vehicle positioning, fare management or ticketing, driver assistance system, E-schedule, diagnostics and Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) systems and Passenger Information System (PIS) (including automatic announcements).
• Customer Oriented Services (COS) domain includes the functions executed by passenger devices such as: access for the passenger's devices (e.g. Wi-Fi access points), Access to the public internet and passenger info-portal. This three-level modelization, presented in Fig. 2 , aims to increase the system flexibility, scalability, and adaptability for future evolutions.
To accomplish all functionalities mentioned above, system actors and devices need to exchange data and commands using communication networks in different communication schemes such as intra-train, train-to-train and train-to-ground communications. Communication networks for future railway systems are expected to be heterogeneous composed of a mixture of several networks and radio access technologies that can be simultaneously accessed by different system actors and devices in order to improve the capacity for communications. For instance, ROLL2RAIL proposes the use of an heterogeneous network architecture combining wireless technologies, such cellular network like LTE, IEEE 802.11, RFID and wired networks where the advantages and specificities of each access network can be taken into consideration [17] . For safety and security purposes, access between different domains will be limited. Indeed, as shown in Figure 2 , the proposed architecture includes also additional network protection devices between different functional domains.
B. External Door control function
Due to space limitation, in this paper, we focus on presenting impact, likelihood and risk evaluation (from step 4 to step 7 in the risk assessment methodology) only for EDC system from TCMS domain. As such, in this section, we provide a detailed description of EDC system.
Based on IEC-61375 Standard [20] , a distributed train functionality is accomplished using several function interfaces installed within the train in an hierarchical way aiming to remotely control processes. Likewise, EDC, being a distributed train application, has the same architecture defined above. As presented in Figure 3 , the EDC system is controlled by the TCMS through interfaces provided by the Train Door Control Unit (DCU). The Train DCU is then the function leader, it is the controlling part for all doors in the train. The Consist DCU is the function follower, it is the agent for one consist. The DCU is the function device, it is responsible for the physical door. The Door is the physical device dedicated to the DCU. In addition to automatic control interfaces, EDC system parts can be manipulated manually using crew interfaces for maintenance purposes or in case of malfunctioning problems.
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IV. RAILWAY THREAT LANDSCAPE A. Threat Assessment
In this section, we study potential threats against TCMS and their characteristics. As such, we present a threat taxonomy that covers mainly cybersecurity threats; which are threats directly applied to ICT assets and thus affecting TCMS operations. We also present non-IT threats to cover threats to TCMS physical assets that are necessary for the system operation. Based on several recent studies published by European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) [21] [22] [23], we identify potential threats against TCMS. These threats can be classified into the following categories:
• Physical attacks. This type of threats is caused by intentional offensive actions aiming to achieve maximum distraction, disruption, destruction, exposure, alteration, theft or unauthorized accessing of assets such as hardware or ICT connections.
• Unintentional damages. These are caused by accidental insider actions [24] including human errors [25] . Unintentional mistakes can be made by authorized employees, users, developers, and testers during data entry, operations, or application development. Such errors can affect the system integrity and stability .
• Outages and disasters. This category contains unexpected disruption of services due to outages and disasters including natural and environmental disasters not triggered by human.
• Failure and malfunctions. This category covers unexpected failure or disruptions of devices or systems including hardware, software and ICT connexions failure or malfunctioning.
• Eavesdropping/Interception/Hijacking. This type of threats contains cyber-attacks and intentional malicious activities or abuse targeting digital assets of a system. Threats from this category consists of altering communication between two parties. These attacks do not have to install additional tools/software on a victim's site.
• Nefarious activities. This category also contains cyberattacks and intentional malicious activities or abuse targeting digital assets of a system. However, attacks belonging to this category usually require the use of tools by the attacker. As such, the threat is accomplished through the installation of additional tools/software or performing additional steps on the victim's IT infrastructure/ software.
The identified threats can be conducted by several types of actors with different motivations. They can be :
• Nation states targeting other nations critical infrastructures, including railway systems. In fact, these systems provide essential services for a nation's society and serve as the backbone of its economy, security, and health. As such, they become a significant target in modern cyber-warfare. Attacks performed by such actors can be politically or economically motivated.
• Non-state organized threat groups including cyberterrorists, cyber-fighters and cyber-criminals. Common to all these threat actors is that they can be organized on local, national or international level. However, their motivations and skill level vary. Cyber-terrorists have political or religious motivations and their capability varies from low to high. Whereas, cyber-fighters are patriotic motivated groups of citizens with strong feelings when their political, national or religious values seem to be threatened by another group and are capable of launching cyber-attack to protest and . Cyber-criminals are organized groups with quite high skill level that attack systems for financial gain.
• Insider threat agents including employees (staff, contractors, operational staff) and third party (vendors, system integrators, and other third party service and product providers) are considered as dangerous threat actors since they have insider access to private facilities and resources and a significant amount of knowledge that allows them to place effective attacks against sensitive parts of the system.
• Hacktivists who are attackers, in many cases with limited technical skills, but rely on ready-to-use attack kits and services, or even third-party botnets, to cause damage to a system e.g., denial of service, defacement as a means of protest. Their protests are often politically motivated.
• Business-oriented attackers interested in performing abusive activities against competitor-controlled cyber-physical systems in order to cause concrete damage and gain business advantages.
• Casual cyber-attackers with little or no technical skills, launching attacks against connected systems and causing serious damage, especially when it comes to connected control systems. It is important to note that individual non state attackers (such as hacktivists, business-oriented attackers and casual attackers) could also be considered by nation states as allies in a low intensity warfare against an opponent nation.
The aforementioned actors are driven by several categories of motivations. We identify two main motivations:
• Political purposes. Since railway systems are part of a nation critical infrastructure, attacking them is considered as a strategical warfare weapon that may cause severe consequences varying from endangering people lives to financial loss and economical impacts. As these systems become increasingly reliant on ICT, they merge as a important target for political motivated cyber attacks. These warefare strategies are already used and they have been multiplied in the few past years. They can be used to cause physical damage or exfiltrating intelligence or secret information. Some well-publicized example is the attack conducted on Iranian Nuclear Facilities by using the worm Stuxnet [26] . According to [27] , Stuxnet was launched by the US and Israel several years ago, in an attempt to sabotage Iran's nuclear program. Actors such as nation states and hacktivists fall in this category.
• Financial purposes. Transportation systems, including railway systems, are the backbone of national economies, providing connections for people and goods, access to jobs and services, and enabling trade and economic growth. Attacking such systems results in financial loss to the service providers, but also cascading consequences on other domains. At railway operator level, attacks can be financially motivated in order to cause business disruption and sales loss. This can cause significant long-term economic impact when reputation of the operators and trust of customers are impacted [28] . Financial motivated attacks are usually performed by business-oriented actors, but also by nation states actors driven by economic reasons. This category of motivation also existed before critical infrastructures became an appealing and sensitive target.
B. Vulnerability Assessment
The integration of cyber-physical systems into critical infrastructures brings not only benefits but also a new set of vulnerabilities for the whole system. The exploitation of such cyber-vulnerabilities can lead to physical consequences. Based on [23] , we identify vulnerabilities of railway systems. These vulnerabilities are divided in two categories: 1-General vulnerabilities for IACS • Wireless and cellular communications. Although such communication technologies brings several advantages to the system, they introduce typical vulnerabilities because communications take place 'through the air' using radio frequencies and thus it is difficult to prevent physical access to them, especially in open and accessible areas like public railway infrastructure. Risk of attacks such as interception and intrusion is greater than with wired networks.
• Increasing system automation. Although automation control improves safety and global system operations by removing possibility of human error, it introduces new vulnerabilities since the surface of attacks increases and therefore risk of attacks increases. 2-Specific vulnerabilities for railway use case • Scale and complexity of railway systems. Railway infrastructure is a large-scale international infrastructure. Applying networked technologies across large railway systems increases number of access points to the system, and thus increases the difficulty and cost. Thereby, securing communications and connectivity between mobile devices on large area is a complicated task.
• Cohabitation between legacy and new systems. Since railway infrastructure is a shared common infrastructure used by different railway companies, the use of legacy equipments and infrastructures introduces new vulnerabilities.
• Multiple independent systems. In addition to legacy problems, railway systems are composed of diverse systems such as sensors, computers, payment systems, emergency systems. It is crucial, but difficult, to ensure smooth interfacing, communication and securing between such independent and heterogeneous systems. This increases vulnerabilities.
• Access to real-time data. Reliable operation of the system requires a non-stop real-time data exchange which may result in costly maintenance and periods of service downtime.
• Online passenger services such as timetabling, passenger information, ticket booking, are also susceptible to cyber attacks.
V. IMPACTS, LIKELIHOOD AND RISK ANALYSIS
A. Impacts and Consequences Determination
A risk [29] is the potential that a given threat will successfully exploit vulnerabilities and thereby produce a negative impact on the system such as confidentiality and privacy problems for the passengers (since the system uses sensing, tracking, real-time behaviour evaluation and automated decisions), interruption and disturbance of transport services which, in addition to dissatisfaction of passengers and disruption of their daily lives, can have secondary consequences on other sectors, loss of revenue, reputation and customers trust, etc [23] . However, the most critical impact is when passengers health and safety are affected. In fact, passengers safety is the priority to all railway systems actors, nonetheless, some incidents may endanger health and safety, not to mention threats coming from terrorism that need to be accounted for when protecting railway systems and infrastructure.
In this step, we investigate impacts of potential threats identified in section IV-A. Table I studies, for each threat, direct impacts and unwanted incidents created on the attacked component and the cascading consequences on the EDC.
The identified impacts can affect one or many areas. We distinguish 3 categories of risk based on the impacted area [30] : safety, financial and operational risks. For each category, we define 3 levels of severity. Regarding the impact determination, we used the method presented in [31] with some modifications. According to [31] , the consequences in each of category are ranked, as shown in Table II, according to their severity level. Decimal power scaling was used for the rating of the severity of consequences assigning them the impact value to distinguish between the severity of consequences both within each area and between areas.
The total impact is calculated as follows:
For evaluating the impact, we use a qualitative scale, presented in Table III , taken from [31] .
B. Unmitigated likelihood determination
The calculation of the likelihood is a major challenge, it is usually accomplished using the Attack Potential (AP) calculation method specified by the standardized method Common Criteria [32] which is also used by the ETSI TVRA [33] and in the risk analysis approach described in [31] . Following this approach, the attack likelihood is determined in two steps: first, determining the AP and then, mapping of the AP to a likelihood. Determining the AP consists of measuring the effort required to mount a successful attack against the considered system. It is assumed that the higher is the AP the lower will be the likelihood of a successful attack. The factors considered in the identification the AP and their ranges and values are listed in Table IV (based on [32] ).
Then, the accumulated attack potential is calculated as follows:
After AP calculation step, we move to AP/likelihood mapping step. To this end, five levels are defined to rate the calculated AP. The rating is done following the approach described in [32] . The AP levels and their mapping to the qualitative scale for the likelihood are shown in Table V .
In New Dependable Rolling Stock for a more Sustainable, Intelligent and Comfortable Rail Transport in Europe (ROLL2RAIL) project, the likelihood, presented in Table VII was determined by estimation, because the lack of information about actual conducted attacks on similar systems does not allow calculating the AP.
C. Unmitigated security risk calculation
The unmitigated cybersecurity risk is determined by means of the risk matrix, presented in Table VI , which was defined specifically for the TCMS cybersecurity risk assessment within the ROLL2RAIL project [34] . The risk matrix is used to calculate the resulting level of risk (Likelihood x Impact) and to identify whether it is acceptable or not. In railway systems, a risk is considered as unacceptable in case its level is major or critical, and as acceptable in case its level is minor or negligible [34] .
The risk matrix also helps in the suggestion of mitigation solutions. In fact, the countermeasures should be deployed in a way to reduce the threat likelihood but never the impact that it could have in the system. As such, if a threat poses an unacceptable risk, we must move in the matrix to the nearest An employee may accidentally enter erroneous use or bad administration of door control system in the maintenance phase.
EDC system A bad or erroneous administration and configuration of the system may lead to erroneous actions and/or improper monitoring commands. In this case, the whole door control system could stop working, doors could be blocked at their current status. The train cannot move until the door control system is fixed. Such incident may also lead to increase cyber-physical vulnerabilities of the systems and create entrance points for other potential threats. UD09 Using information from an unreliable source Erroneous configuration,installation or maintenance data may be used from unreliable sources
EDC system
This can lead to malfunctioning of the door control system or stopping it completely. Doors could be blocked. The train cannot move until the door control system is fixed. Such incident may also lead to increase cyber-physical vulnerabilities of the systems and create entrance points for other potential threats. UNINTENTIONAL DAMAGE UD10 Unintentional change of data in the system or destruction of records recorded data about the state of the system may be changed or deleted
The system usually records data about system functioning at the aim to using them not only for maintenance purposes, but also to strengthen the system against the problems and incidents occurring during operation. such incident leads to loss of operational data.
FM11 Failure of device or systems
In case of a hardware failure in DMI and/or TDCU, the driver is not able to command the whole door system. For TDCU crew interface hardware failure, the crew is not able to isolate specific consist from door operation. In the both cases, the failure is at the train level.
DMI, TDCU and/or TDCU crew interface
The train Line locks the doors. The passengers cannot go out the train until the doors are opened manually.
FM12 Failure of device or systems
In case of a hardware failure in CDCU, the driver is not able to command the door system at the concerned consist. For CDCU crew interface hardware failure, the crew is not able to lock or release doors in specific vehicle of the consist concerned.
CDCU and/or CDCU crew interface
The system may be locally affected, doors at the failed consist cannot be controlled. The train Line locks the doors of the a ected consist. The passengers cannot go out the consist until the doors are opened manually. No data exchange. DMI can not receive any information about doors status. The driver cannot receive information from DMI to ensure that all doors are closed before start moving as such the train cannot move. Commands are also blocked at DMI-TDCU level, the driver is not able to command the door system. For safety reasons, the train Line locks the doors. The passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
OUTAGE
O15 Network outage Outage of cable or wireless network On-Board communication network
No data and monitoring commands exchange between door control system entities. DMI cannot receive any information about doors status. The driver cannot receive information from DMI to ensure that all doors are closed before start moving as such the train cannot move. Commands are also blocked at DMI-TDCU level, the driver is not able to command the door system. In case the train is moving, the driver is also unable to command the door system, as such, for safety reasons, The train Line locks the doors. The passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually. E16 Network Reconnaissance, Network traffic manipulation and Information gathering Malicious activities my be performed at the aim to identify information about network to find security weaknesses On-Board communication network An attacker may learn about weaknesses of the network and use them to disturb the door control system or disconnect its assets.
E17
Man in the middle / Session hijacking An attacker can conduct a MiTM attack, sniff the data and command traffic exchanged between different Door control system entities. As such, he can reveal content of door command and status messages (on train level)
On-Board communication network Operational information could be released. On-Board communication network -DCU
The Train Line locks the doors and does not allow opening them when the train is moving. If the attacker tries to send continuously "close" commands to the door so the passenger cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
Continued on next page
Impact Analysis for External Door Control functionality With Train Lines Safety -continued from previous page Threat Threat Threat Description Asset Cascading effects class ID
E24
Man in the middle / Session hijacking An attacker may send falsified information about train speed to DCU. The doors can be released during train movement or the doors cannot be released when the train stops.
On-Board communication network -DCU
NA25 Denial of Service
An Attacker can conduct Distributed Denial of network service (DDoS) attack at the network layer using several techniques as Protocol exploitation, Malformed packets, Flooding,Spoofing. He can conduct a DDOS attack at the application layer using techniques like Ping of Death, XDoS, WinNuke. He can conduct DDoS attack to both network and application services using amplification/ reflection methods i.e. NTP, DNS .Such type of attack aims to disconnect the network (communication disruption) or degrade the performance of the network, to abuse of resources, to alter network configuration or even physically destroy or alter network components.
On-board communication network DMI is not able to receive information about doors status. The driver cannot receive information to ensure that doors are in the right status. The driver is also not able to command door system. Door system is out of the control. As such, for safety reasons, the train Line locks the doors. Passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
NA26 Malicious code/ software/ activity
An Attacker can access to the network and inject a malicious code, or install a malicious software to conduct a malicious activity within the system. The attacker can use several techniques such as abuse of resources, Worms / Trojans, Rootkits, Elevation of privileges, Viruses, Rogue security software / Rogueware / Scareware, Exploits/Exploit Kits
Door control system
The malicious code or software allows for conducting malicious activities and thus disturbing the system by altering configuration, manipulating data and monitoring commands, disrupting services, disrupting the whole system, changing doors states (unsafe states) or blocking them. The system can also be remotely controlled by attacker using such techniques. If the system detects an abnormal functioning of EDC, the Train Line locks the doors to allow opening them when the train is moving. If the attacker tries to send continuously "close" commands to the door so passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
NA27 Identity Fraud
An Attacker can conduct malicious identity theft actions. This can be done using identity theft malicious computer programs such as credentials-stealing trojan
Door control system
Identity Fraud actions allow attackers to access to the door control system with more advanced privileges such as administrator and thus allow them to commit unauthorized activities such as unauthorised use or administration of devices and systems, unauthorised use of software, unauthorized changes of records. If the attacker attempts to open external doors in an appropriate conditions, the Train Line locks the doors to not allow opening them when the train is moving. If the attacker tries to send continuously "close" commands to the door so passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually. NA28 Manipulation of hardware and software
An attacker can maliciously manipulate hardware and software components of the door control system. Such attacks are done by taking advantages of some IT vulnerabilities, accessing to device software (it could also be done through modifications of code or data, attacking its integrity), or by accessing directly to hardware Door control system (Network, software and hardware)
Loss control of the system, all door control system components can be damaged. The door control system is disrupted. For safety reasons, the train Line locks the doors. Passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually.
NEFARIOUS ACTIVITY
NA29 Manipulation of information
An attacker can maliciously manipulate recorded data about the state of the system. He can also alter system configurations
Door control system
This can lead to loss of data for maintenance and control purposes, malfunctioning of the system in case of altering configuration data which can lead to serious problem and endanger the safety of train and passengers. For safety reasons, the train Line locks the doors. Passengers cannot go out of the train until the doors are opened manually. "Acceptable" cell in the vertical direction. To reduce the impact a change of the architecture of the system is necessary. According to this risk matrix, any catastrophic impact shall be avoided by design (introducing additional systems in the system architecture) because independently of the likelihood level the risk would be unacceptable. 
D. Risk evaluation
When conducting a risk assessment, impacts on the system should be determined without any additional protection system in order to evaluate the real consequences. For the specific case of railway systems, the train operates necessarily with an additional protection control called Train Lines. Train Lines consists of a set of safety functions that aims to protect the train especially in case of abnormal functioning.For example, for EDC, Train Lines system adds doors locking and releasing functions which reduces considerably impacts of the system malfunctioning and especially avoid catastrophic ones.
In the context of ROLL2RAIL, we evaluated impacts of cyber-physcial threats identified in step 2, on the system for both cases; with and without Train Lines safety functions. We started by studying impacts and consequences with Train Lines safety functions transparent. We noticed that all impacts are evaluated critical or catastrophic (mostly catastrophic). These catastrophic impacts according to the risk matrix, presented in Table VI , cannot be avoided independently the likelihood of the threat. Therefore, the only way to avoid this case is to change the evaluated architecture by taking into account the existence of Train Lines. As such, for the current analysis, we are conducting the security risk assessment including the Train Lines, therefore reducing the impact of security threats and making able to set these threats in an acceptable risk level by introducing new countermeasures in the SuC. Likewise, the impacts presented in Table I are also identified with consideration of Train Lines safety functions. 
VI. GOOD PRACTICES
According to the methodology presented in section II, at this level of the risk assessment, we should identify a set of countermeasure with the aim to eliminate unacceptable risks. However, these countermeasures cannot be presented as their are classified. Instead, in this paper, we presents high level countermeasures, sort of good practices that helps to design a properly protected TCMS. In Table VIII , we present a first estimation about time and efforts needed to recover from an unwanted incident, some good practices that helps to avoid exposure of the system to the identified threats or to limit their impacts, and the existent challenges and gaps that may increasing vulnerability and exposure of the system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a security risk assessment of EDC system of Train Control and Monitoring System (TCMS). This work was conducted as a part of ROLL2RAIL project. The security risk analysis showed that the absolute majority of threats targets mainly integrity and availability of the EDC system which can lead to severe consequences. Regarding data confidentiality, this security property is not of huge impact for EDC system. During ROLL2RAIL project, the security risk assessment was conducted for others functionalities of TCMS. At the end, a set of countermeasures was proposed to strengthen the security of TCMS against identified potential threats. The effectiveness of the countermeasures was demonstrated through several iterations of risk evaluation process. Limit physical access to all EDC system components Set up intrusion detection solutions to detect hijacking attempts or other advanced measures preventing such events Employ identity management systems and advanced identification, authentication and authorization techniques Employ alarms to protect digital assets (additional alerting notifications and alarms whenever configuration is modified or for each action of administration of critical components) Establish a recovery processes and maintain backups of the system state Engage in staff training to rise awareness concerning Identification, authentication and authorization problems
